Khartoum Falls Back Under Army Control, but Sudan's Civil War Shifts Westward with Regional Implications

After recapturing Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are poised to shift their military focus westward toward Darfur, where the RSF is laying siege to the city of El Fasher. The battle for control over this last major SAF-held city in the region could significantly reshape the course of Sudan’s civil war — and potentially ignite a broader regional crisis involving neighboring Chad.

On March 26, SAF Commander-in-Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced the military's reclaiming of the capital, following weeks of strategic gains that ultimately forced the RSF to retreat west of the Nile River. Despite the setback, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, dismissed the withdrawal as a tactical repositioning and vowed to continue the fight. Skirmishes have persisted in Omdurman — Khartoum's sister city — and RSF Deputy Commander Abdel Rahim Dagalo has threatened operations in Sudan’s Northern and River Nile states. Reports indicate the SAF is already targeting RSF concentrations west of Al Dabbah.

A Conflict with No End in Sight

The war, which erupted in April 2023 over disagreements on RSF integration into the military, has already caused immense humanitarian suffering: over 150,000 killed, more than 12.6 million displaced internally, and 3.8 million fleeing the country — primarily to Egypt, South Sudan, and Chad.

While the SAF’s control of Khartoum marks a symbolic and strategic milestone, the RSF remains entrenched in Darfur. The group is now intensifying its efforts to seize El Fasher, a move that could consolidate its hold over western Sudan and offset recent territorial losses. Failure to capture new ground, however, may cost the RSF its crucial support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is reportedly reassessing its involvement amid rising international scrutiny and potential overtures toward the SAF.

Chad's Growing Role and the Risk of Regional Spillover

El Fasher’s fate may well determine the trajectory of Sudan’s war, but it also raises concerns beyond Sudan’s borders. The SAF’s westward push increases the risk of conflict spilling into Chad, where reports suggest Emirati weapons destined for the RSF may be routed through airports in N'Djamena and Amdjarass. SAF Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Yasser al-Atta has already warned these airports could become military targets, suggesting an escalation that may involve direct strikes on Chadian territory.

Adding complexity to the situation is the transborder Zaghawa community, which holds significant military influence in Chad. Fearing RSF violence, thousands of Chadian Zaghawa fighters have reportedly joined the SAF. Among them is Ousmane Dillo Djerou, brother of opposition leader Yaya Dillo — who was killed by Chadian forces earlier this year. Djerou has publicly refused to rule out the use of force to remove President Mahamat Deby Itno, further destabilizing Chad’s internal political dynamics.

Stalled Diplomacy and International Maneuvering

Although both the SAF and UAE expressed interest in Turkish-mediated peace talks late last year, there has been no substantive progress. In fact, tensions worsened in March when the SAF-backed government accused the UAE of complicity in genocide at the International Court of Justice.

Meanwhile, reports suggest the UAE is expanding its logistical footprint to continue arming the RSF — including via a new Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the Central African Republic, which may open air corridors through Bangui and Birao.

Looking Ahead: El Fasher as a Decisive Battleground

As the SAF consolidates its control over the capital and possibly reactivates Khartoum’s damaged airport to facilitate humanitarian and military logistics, attention will turn to Darfur. The outcome of the battle for El Fasher could define whether Sudan edges closer to reunification under military rule or descends into effective partition.

The stakes are high: If the RSF captures El Fasher, it could entrench its hold over western Sudan, creating de facto separate zones of control. If the SAF succeeds in breaking the siege, it could fracture RSF cohesion and shift the war’s momentum firmly in the army’s favor — at least temporarily.

What remains certain is that Sudan’s war is far from over — and its next phase may have consequences far beyond its borders.